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The study of identity that I have come to know and understand, both in breadth and depth,
poses four critical challenges.I) The first and basic one involves what I would call the
"conceptual" challenge of how to perceive identity, either in a "static" manner, meaning identity
is perceived as something "given," "ready-made" hence "taken-for-granted," or in a "dynamic"
manner, meaning "identity" is viewed as an ever-changing phenomenon, that is, being redefined,
reconstructed, reconstituted and altered hence problematised. The second challenge is about
the enormously complicated and demanding task of "describing and explaining" the emergence,
consolidation and change of identity or identities over time. The third one is the "analytical"
challenge posed by the continuous re-thinking in "social theory" within which academic analysis
and intellectual discourse on themes such as "identity" are located thus engendering a kind of
"theoretical identity" problem - functionalist, structuralist, post-structuralist? The fourth is
the "authorial" challenge, one that the author-scholar or author-politician's "writing" or "talking
identity" has to confront usually in the form of "objectivity vs. subjectivity" struggle,
particularly if she/he is part of the object of study or is in sympathy with any party involved
politically in an "identity struggle."
Responding to these challenges is no easy task for it demands a depth and breadth of
knowledge based on thorough research or else one risks falling into the all-too-familiar
"stereotype" trap, be it in the form of "Orientalism," "ethnicised knowledge," or the various
kinds of "knowledge fundamentalism." Fully aware of these dangers, I still wish to offer what I
consider as a useful approach for us to begin to grasp both the problems of studying the process
of identity-making as well as the construction of knowledge within that context. Empirically, I
wish to present the Malaysian experience as a case study. Through such an exercise I hope to
elaborate the approach I mentioned above and at the same time to capture some aspects of
Malaysia's struggle in its attempt to come to grips with the never-ending story of identity
formation and contestation that seems to have become a permanent feature of the society's
* Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi,
Selangor, Malaysia
1) There is now a huge collection of literature within the study of identity encompassing almost all the
disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. A few recent titles that I find interesting reading
are Anthony P. Cohen, Self Consciousness: An Altemative Anthropology of Identity [1994] Mike Michael,
Constructing Identity [1996]; Jonathan Friedman, A Cultural Identity and Global Process [1994] and the
contributions in the new journal called Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power with its inaugural
volume published in 1994.
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"culturescape" for the past century or so. I shall now briefly outline my proposed approach
below.
The "Two Social Reality" Approach and the Study of Identity:
"Authority-defined" versus "Everyday-defined" Social Reality
I contend that, like most social phenomenon, identity formation takes place within what I would
call a "two social reality" context: first, the "authority-defined" social reality, one which is
authoritatively defined by people who are part of the dominant power structure; and, second,
the "everyday-defined" social reality, one which is experienced by the people in the course of
their everyday life. These two social realities exist side by side at any given time.2) Although
2) The "Two Social Reality Approach" has a humble origin. It could be traced to a number of sources
which I came across and gathered through direct reading and discussions with colleagues around the
world since I embarked. in 1988. on a long-term study on identity construction in Malaysia. It began
with a working paper entitled "Village, The Contested Terrain: The Malaysian Experience" which
problematised the Malay concept kampung !conveniently translated into English as "village," although
"compound" is more appropriate because the word itself, according to Hobson-Jobson The Anglo-Indian
Dictionary 1886, pp.240-243 is an anglicised version of the Malay word "kampung") and the way it has
been utilised as something given by most Malaysianists. However, I first registered a "protest"
regarding this matter in an article "The Superiority of Indigenous Scholars? Some Facts and Fallacies
with Special Reference to Malay Anthropologists in Fieldwork," Manusia dan Masyarakat (N.S.), 3,
1982, pp.23-33. The "Village" paper was presented at conference on "Village Revisited: Communities
in Southeast Asia" organised by the Centre of Asian Studies Amsterdam (CASA), held at Amsterdam
from 6 to 8 April 1988; led by Professor Jan Breman and Dr. Jeremy Kemp both of whom have, by
then, published their devastating critique of the concept "village" [see, Breman 1988; Kemp 1988], a
concept and analytical tool which has been taken-for-granted by many anthropologists and others who
have conducted field reasearch in so-called "villages." Various versions of the paper, some simplified
or only part of and others expanded, have appeared since and they are: "Kampung: Antara Kenyataan
dan Nostalgia," Dewan Masyarakat, December 1988: 4; "Development and Change in Rural Malaysia: The
Role of the Village Development Committee," Tonan Ajia Kenk.vu (Kyoto, Japan), 26 (2), 1988:
218-228; Village: The Imposed Social Construct in Malaysian Development Initiative, Working Paper no.
115, Faculty of Sociology, Bielefeld University, Germany, 1989; Fonnal Organisations in a Malay
"Administrative Village": An Ethnographic Portrait, Occasional Paper No.15, Center of Southeast Asian
Studies, University of Kent at Canterbury, UK, 1990; "Das Konzept 'Dor' in Unterbsuchungen uber
Malaysia: Zur problematic Analytischer Konzepte in der Konstruktion of Alteritat," Soziale Welt, 8,
1992: 393-403: and "Promise versus Performance: Formal Organisations in Rural Malaysia" in Mason
Hoadly & Christer Gunnarsson (eds.J. Village Concept in the Transfonnation of Rural Southeast Asia,
pp.140-161. London: Curzon Press, 1996. It was not until I read Amin Sweeney's brilliant book, A
Full Hearing: Orality and Literacy in the Malay World, (U ni versity of California, Berkeley, 1987),
subsequently, that of Walter J. Ong's Interfaces of the Word, (Cornell. 1977) followed by a re·reading of
Edward Said's Orientalism (Pantheon, 1978) and, most importantly, the articles on the construction of
racism and racial categories in Malaysia by Charles Hirschman [1985; 1986] that the idea about the
"two social reality" began to take shape. It became consolidated when I re-examined and reflected on
the process of the construction of social scientific knowledge in Malaysia [Shamsul 1995). I first
utilised and applied, in a non-peasant context, the "Two Social Reality Approach" in a working paper,
entitled "Australia in Malaysia's World view," for a Conference on Australia-Malaysia Relations held
by the Centre for Malaysian Studies, Monash University, Melbourne on 20 April 1995 (now published
in the conference proceedings [Shamsul 1996]). 1 have used it quite frequently in my papers and
essays subsequent to this. However, this is my first attempt to explain what this approach is all about.
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intricately-linked and constantly influencing and shaping each other, they mayor may not be
identical. They are in fact rarely identical because the "everyday-defined" social reality is
experienced and the "authority-defined" social reality is only observed and interpreted. Both,
then, are mediated through the social class position of those who observe and interpret social
reality and those who experience it.
Woven and embedded in the relationship between these two social realities is social power,
articulated in various forms such as a majority-minority discourse and state-society
contestation. In concrete familiar terms, it involves social collectives such as religious or
environmental or nationalist movements, political parties, NGOs, professional group, trade union,
charity association, the literary group, the intellectuals, the intelligentsia, the academics and the
like. The discourse takes both oral and written forms, some literary and others simply
statistical, informed usually by various dimensions of the idea about "social justice" reflecting
the wider, inherent social inequality, hence unequal social power, embedded in the "two social
reality" context.
For instance, III the authority-defined context I would include debate and discourse --
mostly designed, systematised and recorded - that have taken place, in the past and at
present, within the government and between government and non-government collectives,
amongst the members of the intelligentsia and within the sphere of realpolitik. In other words,
the discourse in an authority-defined context is not a homogenous one. In fact, it has always
been characterised by vigorous and tense discussions on a broad range of themes and issues,
both minor and major in nature, usually involving a number of social groups, each representing
a particular form of interest. For instance, the discourse on ecological issues between the
government and the opposition political parties or the NGOs may be viewed as a majority-
minority discourse but it remains one which is conducted in the confines of an authority-defined
context. Generally, the discourse in an authority-defined context is textualised, both in
published and unpublished forms, some of which have been weaved into "official policies" and
others written up as "academic publications." In short, the text of such a discourse, even the
oral form, is usually recorded, either in printed form (official reports, policy documents,
newspaper reports, books, magazines, academic journals, photographs, etc.) or, more recently, in
audio-visual electronic form (tape and video cassette recordings, cd-rom, diskettes, films, etc.) .
In an everyday-defined context the discourse is usually disparate, fragmented and intensely
personal conducted mostly orally. Since it is overwhelmingly an articulation of personal
experience, not meant to be systemised or positioned for a particular pre-determined macro
objective, it is therefore not textualised for "future reference," except occasionally by
researchers, such as anthropologists or historians who would have tape-recorded or written
down, as ethnographic notes, these "personal narratives." More interestingly, these narratives
are often captured in what is generally categorised as "popular forms of expression" or "popular
culture," such as cartoons, songs, poems, short-stories, rumour and gossips, poison letters and
the like. Irrespective of what each "narrative" has to tell, how popular it has been accepted
across the society and whether or not it represents contemporary public concern, it is usually
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considered as an individual or personal contribution from the "author" (cartoonist. singer, poet,
short-story writer, etc.). As such it remains a subjective "text" often considered as
"unrepresentative" of the empirical reality or "truth," not dissimilar in status with the legally
unacceptable "hearsay" evidence.
Until recently, such "texts" have been rejected outright as a source or form of research data
by some social scientists because they are categorised as being "unscientific" or "not objective,"
and would prefer instead the "scientific statistics," even if they are concocted or manipulated
ones. The "subjective" nature of the "text" of the everyday-defined social reality is never in
doubt but the consistent rejection of it as a valid source of information and data is tantamount
to the political supression, even exclusion, of the "voices from below" or the "subaltern voices"
from mainstream consideration and concern. This reminds us the old "orality-literacy" contest
all over again, but it is not simply that. This rejection, often subtle and taken-for-granted, has
been "normalised" into our daily life. One has only to read the newspapers which without fail
always represent the authority-defined voices of all types and rarely the everyday-defined ones,
except perhaps in the "letter to editor," "individual columnist" or "entertainment" section.
This indeed reflects the inter-connectedness and dialectical nature of the relationship
between the authority-defined and everyday-defined social reality, which, of course, has its
material basis. Often the politics and poetics of this relationship is ignored or its material
basis unexamined. This is most obvious in the intellectual realm of society, in which there has
been a tendency to disconnect, on the one side, "social theory," and, on the one other, "public
intellectual life" and the "moral concerns of real people"; the former has been assumed as the
"authority" and not the latter hence its arbitrary separation. This is not dissimilar to the way
many of us perceive the status of and relationship between authority-defined and everyday-
defined discourse in which we tend to favour the former.
I suggest that the study of identity would be enriched tremendously by adopting this "two
social reality" approach. giving both types of "reality" as balanced an attention as possible.
Analytically, it is also useful to examine each of this reality separately. In fact, this has been
the case in most studies on identity, in which the major focus has been on the debate and
discourse within the authority-defined context. There are those which have concentrated on
what happened within the everyday-defined realm. Many have done both rather successfully
without using or being aware of the "two social reality" approach. Nonetheless, the great
utility of this approach is that one would be in a position to capture the macro picture and the
detailed internal micro dynamics in a more balanced manner. This in turn should help to
inform the construction of arguments and narratives at both the macro and micro levels, even
though eventually one might want to highlight only one part of the "social reality." Another
useful contribution of this approach is that it encourages the analyst to allow the voices of the
social actors to speak openly about their experience in contrast to the authority-defined one
which is based on observation and interpretation.
Thus by adopting this approach I hope the essay opens the way for us to capture the
uncertainties, ruptures and tensions, which emerge from the debate on identity in Malaysia
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conducted thus far. We are also in a better position to highlight the alternatives, their
attendant differences, however slight, the distances between them and, most significantly, the
dialogue between them, fruitful or futile, eventful or mundane. As such this attempt shall also
allow us to make sense both the status-quo and dissenting voices in the Malaysian present-day
social milieu with regard to the single most important question in Malaysia, that is, the national
identity.
However, in the present contribution, I wish to focus mainly on the identity debate within
the authority-defined context in Malaysia, in particular, amongst the Malays and, to a certain
extent, the larger bumiputera (lit. son of soil) group. There are a number of reasons that could
be offered here to justify this choice but suffices to say that the social category "Malay" (for
that matter Chinese, Indian, Kadazan and Iban, too) has always been used as something given
and taken-for-granted. Secondly, in analytical terms, it has also been used as tool for analysis,
rather automatically, in pair or cluster with other social categories, such as "Malay-nonMalay,"
"Malay-Chinese" or "Malay-Indian." This in turn has resulted in "essentialising" the Malays
(and simultaneously the Chinese, Indian and Others, too) giving it a set of ideal-typical
attributes for the sake of analysis thus encouraging the obviously simplistic perception that
Malays as a social group is a homogenous one. What seems to be an analytical convenience, in
fact "orientalist" in spirit, has developed into a "scientific approach" thus "Malay" or
"Malayness" as a social category has never been problematised or perceived as something
constructed, invented, artificial despite the fact that "what it means" and "what it is" have
always been altered, redefined, reconstituted and the boundaries expanded according to specific
social-historical circumstances, especially after the introduction of colonial "racism" and "racial
category" into the realm of authority-defined and everyday-defined social reality in British
Malaya.3 )
In this essay I also wish to capture the continuous, intense, often lively and fiery, internal
discussions on the subject of identity within the Malays, and to a lesser extent amongst the
larger bumiputera context, especially amongst the various fractions of its elites, in particular
during the postwar period, during which the British was in command for the first decisive
decade. Subsequently Malaysia came under the so-called bumiputera rule.4 ) I would argue
3) Harper [1996: 240] claims that "many analysts [read Malaysianists] now insist that these [ethnic]
loyalties are continually under construction, being redefined and contested." What these "analysts"
have failed to note is the fact that this phenomenon of "construction, redefination and contestation"
within Malaysia's communalism is nothing new. What is new is the rather recent discovery of a new
set of analytical tools (perhaps postmodernist/poststructuralist in nature?) by Malaysianists to
examine the same subject matter which they have been looking at for decades using, previously, other
sets of analytical tools. To the social actors themselves, particularly the Malays, they have been
involved in the "construction of Malayness" or "constituting the Malay" discourse since early this
century. Reading original Malay texts, such as the early editions of Utusan Melayu, particularly the
editorials, would have helped Harper and his company of analysts. Harper should have read Milner's
recent book (published in 1994, not 1995 as Harper indicated) more carefully, especially the
"Introduction" chapter.
4) A number of Malaysianists have made serious analytical attempts to characterise the "Malaysian state"/
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that within the authority-defined context the contesting VOices amongst the Malays, and
bumiputera, in postwar Malaysia could be divided, arbitrarily, into two camps, "the dominant"
and "the dominated" ones, each representing a different view and articulating dissimilar
interests (material and ideological) but by no means internally homogenous even within each of
these fractions. In other words, I am interested to examine briefly the politics and poetics of
identity amongst the Malay elite and intelligentsia because of late many analyses on the Malays
have prefered to emphasise the material success enjoyed particularly by its middle class and
b .. 5)ourgeOlsle.
We also need to grasp the ideological, and in many ways "abstract," contestation that goes
with Malaysia's modernisation project. There is a need to explore what happens in the political
space, beyond politics of parties and numbers, particularly in the realm of ideas, symbols and
perceptions, especially relating to identity and in particular "national identity.,,6J Therefore, I
thought it is also useful to survey briefly the influence of the authority-defined discourse on
identity upon the construction of social scientific knowledge in Malaysia for we know very well
",.as either a "Malay," "Bumiputera" or "Indigenized" one [see, Toh 1982; Ho 1990; Lee 1995]. If we
were to use the same approach adopted by these scholars and analyse the "Singapore state" instead,
we should come to the conclusion that Singapore is an "Overseas Chinese," "Singkeh" or "Migrant"
state. Indeed. if we were to apply Wang Gungwu's "migrant state" concept [1996: 1I -12] in a more
liberal fashion, Singapore would definitely fit the Wang Gungwu's bill.
5) I have, in 1988, contributed to the raging debate amongst the intelligentsia in Malaysia on
consumerism and the middle class phenomenon by asking "Adakah anda anggota kelas menengah?"
[Are you a member of the middle class?] in my monthly column in Dewan Masyarakat, September 1988,
p. 4. I also remember being asked, soon after that. by private and government funding agencies in
Malaysia, the USA, Japan and Australia, to evaluate a number of research proposals. individual and
team-based, on topics related to the theme "Asia's new middle class and the new rich." The prelimi-
nary results of some of such research have been published recently. The most recent is the volume
edited by Robison and Goodman [1996].
6) A useful recent example, if an extremely eclectic one, of what I would categorise as an "authority-
defined" discussion on "Malay nationalism" and "national identity" in Malaysia is that of Ikmal Said's
[1995], who seemed to have combined the a-historical. a-structural and static "plural society"
approach with the more pragmatic "cultural approach" of the Malaysianist brand. Ikmal's, of course,
is not alone in applying this "plural society-cum-cultural" approach to the Malaysian context. It was
first "proposed" and elaborated in a two-paged essay by Joel Kahn [1988-89]. Kahn's essay hence
approach was criticised strongly by Johan Saravanammuttu and Maznah [1989] for its problematic
ahistorical-astructural orientation and flawed culturalist arguments. Kahn ignored completely these
criticisms and proceeds to expand them in his subsequent publications [see, Kahn 1992; 1994; 1995;
1996]. Francis Loh Kok Wah, in a working paper entitled, "Studying Ethnic Politics in Malaysia:
From Plural Society to Political Economy to .. ," a paper read at the Conference on the Role and
Orientation of Malaysian Social Science in the 21st Century, Malaysian Social Science Association.
Petaling Jaya, 26-27 August 1991, made an unsatisfactory attempt to elaborate on the so-called
"cultural approach," one which was not dissimilar in content and argument to that of Kahn's
[1988-89]. Together, Kahn and Loh subsequently edited a volume of published and unpublished
essays entitled Fragmented Vision [1992] which launched the so-called "cultural approach" in
Malaysian social studies based on the problematic orientation and flawed argument. Since it has no
resemblance to the "cultural studies" approach initiated by the Centre for Contemporaray Cultural
Studies at the University of Birmingham, I find it more useful. perhaps more appropriate too, to call
this approach simply as a "fragmented" approach in Malaysian social studies.
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that knowledge is never really "value-free." I also wish to present the general scenerio of the
process that I call the "ethnicisation of knowledge" in the context of Malaysian social scientific
studies and highlight the hidden "social justice" agenda that informed much of that construction
process. However, it is necessary to first briefly examine the origin of the discourse on
"nation," "national identity" and "nationhood" in Malaysia.
The Question of Identity and "the Nation": Origin of a Discourse
The question of identity and "the nation" in Malaysia, or "national identity," remains contested
to this day. This contest is of interest to a variety of people, academic and non-academic, local
and foreign. While we are always attracted to the contemporariness of this matter and its
present-day implications, its history must be clearly understood. It is a fact that social
categories such as "race" (both its biological and social component and meanings) and "nation"
entered into local cosmology and worldview through colonisation hence the slow dismantling of
the traditional thought system in due course and its displacement by the Western-based system.
The introduction of such a system often has a humble and unnoticed beginning. For instance,
what seemed to be a "harmless" bureaucratic practice of census-taking have actually helped to
invent, evolve and consolidate "racial categories" such as Malay, Chinese and Indian in Malaysia
[Hirschman 1985; 1986; Milner 1994; Shamsul in press]. The introduction of legislations like
the Malay Reservation Act, the setting up of a Department of Chinese Affairs and the special
government-approved toddy shops for the Indians during the British rule drove home the point
further, at the everyday-defined level, to the people at the grassroots that racial categories such
as Malay, Indian and Chinese mattered very much if one is to take advantage what the colonial
bureaucracy offered or in order to avoid its wrath. Hence being a "Malay," a "Chinese" or an
"Indian" the colonialist way is critical for everyday existence.
The evolution and consolidation of these racial categories was accompanied by political
conscientization through colonial bureaucratic practices and race-specific socialisation
particularly through a plural Western-oriented vernacular education system. It was in such a
context that the racial categories, once consolidated and became meaningful to the social actors,
developed into ideas about racial-based notions about nation hence issues of identity and its
economic and political implications. In other words, there was a two-way traffic in the
appropriation exercise during the colonial period, not only the colonialists were appropriating
what the locals have to offer but the locals too were selecting, appropriating and internalising
what the colonialist offered them (both through coercion and other methods). Hence
"difference" as a defining mode of everyday existence, as opposed to the top-down "homogenising
schemes," dominated the mind and practical life of the populace.
Therefore, being a "Malay" or "Chinese" or "Indian" and demanding for a "Malay nation" or
"Chinese nation" or "Indian nation," historically, was not the result of a simple diffusionist
process or "derivative discourse," as argued rather simplistically by Ikmal [1995].7) This led
to the gross error that he made in his analysis and interpretation of Malay nationalism, which
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he characterises as a movement that "... does not attempt to carve out a politically autonomous
area for itself. Rather, it is a project that seeks to build a Malay political roof over the
structures of the modern state" [ibid.: 13J. He confuses the political outcome that emerged
after the failure of the Malay nationalist project as the objective of the movement. He must
have known that, first and foremost, as a movement Malay nationalism is not a homogenous one,
it was divided into at least three major streams [Roff 1967], each with its own vision of "a
Malay nation" hut none finally materialised. As a replacement the British-endorsed "united
kingdom of Malay keraJ'aan" (a federal state) was installed instead. This was also meant as an
alternative to the aborted British-designed "Malayan Union" (a unitary state). Both, the
successful British-endorsed and the failed British-designed political solutions were clearly not
the envisaged "Malay nation." Whether the "united kingdom of Malay kerafaan" serves as "... a
Malay political roof over the structures of the modern state," as argued by Ikmal, is doubtful,
but it is analytically convenient to suggest so.
The discourse regarding "the nation" issue however took a new twist after Independence,
articulated in rhetorics about "national integration," "national unity" and "national identity." At
the "dominant" authority-defined level, which is bumiputera-dominated, the identity question is
perceived by the government as a non-issue because its basis and content has been spelt out in
a number of policy documents within the framework of the Malaysian Constitution. It is a
bumiputera-defined identity that has privileged many aspects of bumiputera culture as the "core"
of the Malaysian "national" identity while recognising, if peripherally, the cultural symbols of
other ethnic groups [Kementerian Kebudayaan, Belia dan Sukan, Malaysia 1972; Aziz Deraman
1975] .
Within the "dominated" authority-defined context, the bumiputera-based authority-defined
national identity pushed by the government has been challenged by at least three groups. The
first is the non-bumiputera group, led by the Chinese [Kua Kia Soong 1985; Lim Kit Siang 1986;
Ling Leong Sik 1995J, who reject the bumiputera-based and bumiputera-defined national identity
in preference for a more "pluralised" national identity, in which the culture of each ethnic group
in Malaysia is accorded a position equal to that of the bumiputera. For instance, the Chinese
suggest that Chinese language and rituals should be considered as an integral part of the
national identity. The second and third groups are bumiputera ones, namely, the non-Muslim
bumiputera group and the radical Islamic bumiputera group, each offering its own notion of
identity and "the nation" based on their version of nation-of-intent. i.e., its own vision of what
the national identity should be, based on a particular ideological framework [Shamsul 1996aJ.
7) Perhaps Ikmal should not have accepted uncritically arguments by Partha Chatterjee in his. Nationalist
Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? [1984]. I suggest we should take seriously
the question mark (7) in the subtitle of Chatterjee's book. Most of the unanswered issues in this
book were elaborated. with new arguments offered. in a later book of Chatterjee's, Nations and Its
Fragments [1993]. Ikmal should have also considered arguments by Arvind N. Das, India Invented: A
Nation in the Making [1994]. which provide us an alternative perspective on "Indian nationalism" to
that of Chatterjee.
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Although both the bumiputera groups accept the authority-defined bumiputera-based national
identity, the non-Muslim bumiputera suggest that Christianity and "native religions" be accorded
equal status to that of Islam, as components within it. The Muslim bumiputera, on the contrary,
rejects what it sees as the secular, modernist Islamic component of the identity in preference for
a "truer and purer" Islam. The Kadazan of Sabah argue forcefully for the non-Muslim
bumiputera case [Kitingan 1987; Loh Kok Wah 1992] and the Parti Islam of Kelantan for the
radical Islamic bumiputera group [Alias Mohamed 1991].
Even though the open and peaceful debate on the question of national identity is recent in
origin it has deep social roots in Malaysian colonial experience.B) However, the single most
important event which encouraged this open debate was the now famous proclamation regarding
Wawasan 2020, or Vision 2020, made by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister, in early
1991, which was motivated by a number of reasons, one of which is the concern over the one-
sided nature of Malaysia's achievement thus far, which has been heavily economic in nature, and
not matched by a similar achievement in the political sphere. In other words, Malaysian
political difficulties are perceived as more serious than the economic ones hence to Mahathir the
political challenge of creating "a united Malaysian nation," or a Bangsa Malaysia, is the greater
and critical one compared to the economic challenge of sustaining the current level of economic
growth in Malaysia's effort to become modern. This implies that Malaysia is still "one state
with several nations," meaning that in the broad economic sense it is a coherent variant of a
capitalist entity, but in the political and ideological sense it is still searching for a parallel
coherence because there exist strong competing nations-of-intent, or a "second generation
nationalism," hence the debate on identity, especially national identity, is still widely open.
Thus, one could argue that Malaysia is a "nationless" state, one which is still in search of
the elusive "united Malaysian notion" and in which various notions of nation-of-intent are still
entertained hence the question of national identity. Many analysts have failed to recognise or
highlight the fact that dissenting voices are present and heard, within and without government,
in Malaysia and a healthy competing discourse on "nation-of-intent" and "national identity" is
taking place amongst the Malaysians, particularly the Malays. The government may be
controlling the mass media but this does not mean, as many foreign observers claim, that these
voices are muted or silenced. The lack of lively intellectual discussions in the main English-
language press, which have been the main source of information for the foreign observers,
8) Harper [1996: 239] suggested that "although British imperial rule did not create Malaysian politics, it
contributed much to the manner in which they would be conducted in the future." I find this
statement conceptually misinformed and empirically incorrect. It is perplexing how he could have
arrived at such a conclusion after reading Milner [1994] who argued just the opposite. But then
Harper cannot be blamed entirely here because what Milner [1994] has presented in his narrative and
argument regarding "the invention of politics" amongst the Malay elites early this century could be
totally be misread owing to his failure to recognise conceptually the fact that the "invention of
politics" was preceded by "the invention of identity" (racial-ethnic categories as understood in the
Social Darwinistic sense) through British colonialism which, in turn, informed the whole process of
"the invention of politics" that he talked about.
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perhaps has made them arrive at this conclusion. However, dissenting voices III Malaysia are
articulated in minor vernacular dailies, such as in the Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, Kadazan or Iban
language; yet others can be found in the form of cassette and video tapes, pamphlets, "poison
letters," political party manifestos, and the like, hence inaccessible to most of these observers,
whose dependence on English-speaking, Kuala Lumpur-based, middle-class bumiputera and non-
bumiputera for information is a well-known fact.
Before proceeding further I wish to briefly outline what I mean by the concept "nation-of-
intent," a concept first introduced by Rotburg [1966] in his study of "African nationalism" and
applied to the Malaysian context by Rustam A. Sani [1975] in his study of the "Malay Left."
By nation-of-intent I mean a more or less precisely defined idea of the form of a nation, i.e. its
territory, population, language, culture, symbols and institutions. The idea must be shared by a
number of people who perceive themselves as members of that nation, and who feel that it unites
them, but it does not necessarily imply an aspiration for political self-rule on the part of the
group of people who are advancing their nation-of-intent. It depicts an idea of a nation that
still needs to be constructed or reconstructed. It promises the citizens (or some of them) an
opportunity to participate in a "grand project" which they can claim is theirs. It may be an
inclusive construct, open to others, and which is employed as the basis for a political platform
voicing dissent or a challenge to the established notion of nation. In the Malaysian context, the
nation-of-intent concept therefore bridges the authority-defined and the everyday-defined idea of
a nation. As admitted by Mahathir, the "united Malaysian nation" is yet to be born. Hence
various social groups in Malaysia can still voice their different nations-of-intent.
Unlike Anderson's concept of "imagined political community" [Anderson 1991: 11], nation-
of-intent is a more open-ended concept. One could call it "a second generation nationalism." It
is more positive, proactive and forward-looking. It has a programmatic plan of action
articulated in realpolitik which has, in the Malaysian case, emerged not only from a historical
context of anti-colonialism but also in the post-colonial era. In the post-colonial era it serves as
an alternative way of formulating political intentions even though, mostly, it remains at the
discourse level. However, in a number of cases, especially in particular localities, the idea of
advancing alternative nations-of-intent has found concrete expression, hence political space.
This is what has happened in the local states of Kelantan and Sabah. In both states, the local
ruling party, which opposes the Malaysian UMNO-dominated government, has made serious
attempts not only to continue to articulate its own nation-of-intent but also to implement some
aspects of it locally. Even though these attempts have met with limited success, they have
demonstrated that it is possible to have and hold on to one's nation-of-intent, or concept of
national identity, and implement it within the so-called "authoritarian" political context in
Malaysia.
Malay and Bumiputera Notions of Nation and National Identity
One may ask: what are the origin and social roots of these debates? How, for instance, has it
- 17- 485
influenced the shaping of official policies, distribution of development projects and even the
construction of social scientific knowledge about Malaysia? It is therefore useful for us to
examine the historical origin and social roots of the debates on identities in Malaysia, both
within the bumiputera and the non-bumiputera groups, in the past and at present.g) The best
approach to adopt in this effort is through the study of the evolution of the political parties and
other ethnic-based social organisations, from an authority-defined perspective. In the present
case, the specific focus is amongst the Malays and also other bumiputera. lO ) The former is
mostly in Peninsular Malaysia and the latter in Sabah and Sarawak.
The Malays in Peninsular Malaysia
We must recognise the fact that the authority-defined nation-of-intent which is promoted
currently in Malaysia is not only a bumiputera-based one but also only one of the many found
within the bumiputera community. It is not Kadazan or Iban but one that emerged amongst the
Malay community in Peninsular Malaysia some 50 years ago and was eventually institution-
alised and endorsed by the British after the Second World War. This nation-of-intent belongs
to the Malay "administocrat" faction, which is one of the three nationalist elite factions within
the Malay community in Peninsular Malaysia. This administocrat group organised itself as a
political party called the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and eventually became
"the definer" within the "authority" context. UMNO's rise to power had the support of the
British. It is useful to trace briefly the general development of UMNO, particularly the content
of its nation-of-intent and its implementation [see also Funston 1980]. This should give us an
overall idea how Malaysia arrived at its present stage with a contested, or yet to be born,
nation. This is relevant because it is UMNO's version of what Malaysia should be that has
now become the object of reconsideration, even reconstruction, especially after Mahathir's grand
Vision 2020 appeared. The latter has, in turn, increased the tempo of the discussion on the
various nations-of-intent amongst the populace.
9) Perhaps it is useful for me to remind us of the fact that the concept "nation," "national identity" and
"nationalism" are used interchangeably in this essay as components of the larger ideational umbrellic
term called "nationhood," be it in the past (as "imagined community") or in the future (as "nation-of-
intent") . Equally important to bear in mind is the fact that, in the Malaysian context, as a result of
history, these concepts are ethnicity-bound, in spite of the claim and promise that the future "united
Malaysian nation" shall be more "multicultural." Perhaps in other circumstances and contexts, they
are not ethnicity-bound, instead religion-bound. such as in Israel and Ireland [Weissbrod 1983].
10) I have discussed in some detail the debate within the community of Chinese elites elsewhere [Shamsul
1996a] not only about their perceptions on "national identity" but also how these discussions actually
reflect their own view what constitute "Chineseness." I am quite certain many Malaysianists are also
aware of the fact that the Chinese community. numerically, are not really a minority in a traditional
demographic sense hence the importance and influence of the Chinese version of the nation-of-intent
must not be under-rated. This also implies that the so-called "majority-minority dichotomy" vis-a-vis
"bumi and non-bumi" commonly used as analytical tools in Malaysian social studies is always a
problematic one. It could in fact be a misleading one. Hence the potentiality of a misrepresentation
of reality, or straightfoward distortion, in such a circumstance is very high indeed.
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Since the end of the Second World War, we have seen at least four phases of the
implementation of the administocrats' (read UMNO's) "vague" idea of a nation, made possible
initially by British military and material support. The first phase was during the reign of Onn
Jaafar, UMNO's first president.Il ) His preferred "nation" was a "plural society nation." It was
hardly an original idea because its content was not dissimilar from the concept of nation
proposed by the British in its Malayan Union project of 1946, which had failed because of
opposition from a movement in which Onn Jaafar played a leading role. Still Onn Jaafar's
attempt to turn UMNO into a multi-ethnic party must be said to have been based on the "plural
society nation" idea which he thought suitable for the Malaysian multi-ethnic society. His
adoption of such a concept of nation is not surprising in view of the fact that the Malayan
Union concept was replaced by a federal concept, hence the Federation of Malaya Agreement in
1948, which, essentially, recognised the primacy of negeri-based kerajaan (provincial-based
traditional Malay polity) and the sultan as its symbolic ruler. In effect, UMNO then had no
concept of nation in the sense articulated by Mahathir at present. Eventually, Onn Jaafar had
to resign as UMNO's president when UMNO members rejected his "plural society nation," which
was perceived as abandoning Malay interests. It is interesting to note that Onn Jaafar left
UlV1NO and formed a short-lived multi-ethnic party.
The second phase began when Tunku Abdul Rahman took over the leadership of UMNO
from Onn Jaafar. He adopted a similar viewpoint to that of ann Jaafar, but advocated a "Malay
UMNO," retaining it as a communal party and thus emphasising the primacy of Malay ethnic
interests while recognising the interests of other ethnic groups. The third phase began when
Abdul Razak replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman soon after the Kuala Lumpur May 1969 racial riot.
He continued to retain the "plural society nation" framework. He, however, further emphasised
the primacy of Malay political hegemony, hence began the third phase. This was written into
an amended Constitution and subsequently incorporated as a principle in the formulation of
public policies and institutions, particularly in the form of the NEP, popularly known as the
bumiputera policy. Hussein ann, who succeeded Razak after his untimely demise in 1976,
adopted the same framework.
It was not until 1981, when Dr Mahathir Mohamed took over from Hussein ann, that the
framework was modified to suit global changes and Mahathir's own vision of Malaysia's future
as a Newly Industrialised Country (NIC): hence the commencement of the fourth phase, which
we are observing now. The pro-Japan "Look East Policy" was born out of this ambition.
However, Mahathir's vision of Malaysia's future, which was later operationalised into policy
initiatives in the 1980s, did not alter the basics of Razak's version of a Malay-dominated plural
society. Therefore, Mahathir's contribution was simply to turn Malaysia, a Malay-dominated
plural society, into an Nrc.
It is in this historical and ideological context that we should locate Mahathir's Vision 2020.
11) The best up-to-date historical analysis and biography on Dato Onn Jaafar is by Ramlah Adam, Data
Onn Jaafar:Pengasas Kemerdekaan [1992].
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To my mind it is really a restatement, if an upgrading, of his earlier commitment, made in 1981
soon after he became prime minister, to turn Malaysia into an NIC [Shamsul 1992]. It is also a
statement about what is to come after the NEP, which ended in 1990, especially regarding the
future of the bumiputera's role in the economy and of inter-ethnic relations and socio-political
stability of Malaysia, essentially.
In a historical sense, it could be argued that this is also the first time UMNO is promoting a
clear concept of nation, beyond the negeri-based kerajaan framework nation and the British-
initiated "plural society nation." But the fact remains that the present (UMNO) Malay-
dominated Malaysian state is articulating only one version amongst the many of the nations-of-
intent that exist within the bumiputera community. Besides the administocrats, the other two
factions within the Malay nationalist movement then were the Malay Islamic faction and the
Malay left, each with its own political agenda for the "Malay nation" which they proposed to
establish if they got into power.
The Islamic faction, represented by the Parti Islam (PI), offers an "Islamic nation" as its
nation-of-intent. However, this idea was suspended briefly when in the early 1970s the party
joined the UMNO-dominated ruling coalition party, namely, the National Front (NF). PI left
NF in 1977 and has since been on its own. It has won back the majority in the State
Legislative Assembly of Kelantan in the last two general elections of 1990 and 1995. It has also
become more fundamentalist than before in the sense that it has rejected the notion of assabiyah,
or ethnic group-based nation, and prefers an Islamic-based one, which considers every Muslim
as equal in the eyes of Allah irrespective of colour, creed or race. So, PI's concept of "Islamic
nation" simply means a nation of Muslims and non-Muslims organised and administered using
Quranic principles and Islamic laws. Perhaps the attempt to introduce and implement the strict
Islamic hudud law in Kelantan recently is part of the strategy towards establishing a local
prototype for the Islamic nation it wants to establish throughout Malaysia. However, it has not
been able to convince the non-bumiputera that it is not a bumiputera party using Islam as an
ideological platform. Ironically, UMNO, in an effort to show how tolerant its "Islam" is, has
joined the non-bumiputera to condemn PI for "abusing" Islam.
The Malay left, active since before the war, had Melayu Raya (including all of what came to
be Indonesia) as its first nation-of-intent, in which it imagined that all Malays in one region
should come together and see themselves as "One Race, speaking One Language, and belonging
to One Nation" [Firdaus Abdullah 1985; Ikmal Said 1992]. Like the Chinese-dominated
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) , the Malay left was disfavoured by the British for its
Indonesian connections. Wary of the fact that the Dutch were humbled after the war by an
army of indigenous freedom fighters, some motivated by socialist ideals, API (Angkatan Pemuda
Insaf), the militant-oriented youth section of the Malay left was banned by the British in 1948.
Later, in 1950, Parti Kebangsaan Melayu (Malay Nationalist Party), also part of the Malay left,
was disbanded. As a result, the Malay left became considerably weakened. However, it
reappeared in November 1955 in the form of the Malay-dominated Parti Rakyat Malaysia
(PRM). Together with the non-bumiputera-controlled Labour Party it formed a loosely
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organised Socialist Front (SF) and won a number of seats in the general elections of 1959 and
1964 but split after 1967. PRM continued to soldier on but with little success with its original
idea of Melayu Raya. The party still exists today but more as "conscience party," fighting for
the poor and exploited, against corruption and nepotism in the government. However, it has
failed to receive real political support from the bumiputera mass and consists of a handful of
academics, middle-class and trade union elites, mostly bumiputera.
Bumiputera in Sabah and Sarawak
After the formation of Malaysia, in 1963. bumiputera communities in the states of Sabah and
Sarawak made their entry into Malaysian politics. In Sabah, the Christian Kadazan and the
Muslim Dusun have dominated Sabah politics to this day [Loh 1992]. In Sarawak, it is the
non-Muslim Iban and the Muslim Melanaus who have been dictating politics Dayum Jawan
1993]. However, in both states, the Chinese community has represented the critical third party
whose support is much needed by any of the bumiputera groups aiming to control the local state.
Except for the small marginalised group of mainly non-Muslim Orang Asli, or the
aborigines, the bumiputera community in the Peninsula is dominated by Malays, who are
constitutionally-defined Muslims. 12 ) However. the majority of bumiputera in Sabah and Sarawak
are non-Muslim. This situation is further complicated by other forms of cultural difference
and, most important of all, economic difference. For instance, most of the Malays were
peasants when independence came but the bumiputera of Sarawak and Sabah are a mixed lot.
some urbanised. some peasants and many, like some of the Orang Asli in the Peninsula, were
forest dwellers when Malaysia was formed. These specific material and cultural circumstances
shaped the bumiputera politics within Sabah and Sarawak, which sometimes put them in
opposition to Peninsular Malaysia, the centre. This came quite early after the formation of
Malaysia. It happened, first, in the Iban-dominated state of Sarawak. The then state
government, under its premier Stephen Kalong Ningkan, tried to assert its autonomy and this
was perceived by the federal government as an attempt at separatism resulting in the imposition
12) There exists a large collection of mostly unpublished materials on the Orang Asli in Peninsular
Malaysia. However, it is extremely rare to find anything related to the "politics" or the "economic
plight" of this group. Most of these studies have been rather "exotic-cum-cultural" in nature,
emphasising, for instance, the "non-violent" nature of this group. Based on Walker's [1995] recent
survey of written materials on Orang Asli, I would argue that "Oriental ism" still has a strong grip on
the study of Orang Asli in Malaysia, mirroring the way the present Malaysian state's treatment of
anything to do with the Orang Asli. However, recent contributions by Zawawi Ibrahim [1995; 1996
and his latest in this volume] and Gomes [1994] have made attempts to redress this "analytical
problem." The latest interesting development involving the Orang Asli is the attempt made by an
NGO, led by a non-Orang Asli and based in Peninsular Malaysia. to construct a "pan-indigenous"
social category called "Asal" (lit. origin) linking the non-Muslim and non-Malay bumiputera of
Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah through the issue of land. After all bumiputera means "sons
of the soil" hence the creation of "Asal" could be seen as an effort by a section of the indigenous group
to reappropriate the "land" that once belonged to them through the invention of an identity or an
ethnic category, not dissimilar to the way the social category called "Kadazan" was invented in Sabah
in the earBy 1960s [Loh 1992J.
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of emergency rule in the state in 1966. Later in Sabah, when its premier Donald Stephens tried
to champion the cause of the Kadazan, this was also perceived by the central government as an
attempt to seek an unacceptable level of autonomy. In 1967 he was replaced by Datu Mustapha,
a Muslim Sulu chief and a leader of the Muslim Dusun.
These events set the tone of subsequent political relations between the states and federal
government, not only between the Peninsula-based federal centre and the local states of Sarawak
and Sabah but also within the Peninsula. It was because of this contentious relationship that
the bumiputera of Sarawak and Sabah began to create their own visions of what Malaysia should
be, namely their nations-of-intent, which are quite different from those generated by the specific
historical circumstances and ethnic configurations in Peninsular Malaysia. As a consequence,
the use of bumiputera as an ethnic symbol in the attempt to create a kind of joint nationhood in
Malaysia seemed to work in the opposite direction. The gap between the nationalist ideology,
represented by bumiputeraism, and the social practice, the emergence of divergent versions of
bumiputeraism, reinforces Anderson's point that any community which is based on wider links
and not on face-to-face contact is an imagined one, hence constantly open to contestation. The
rise of "Kadazan nationalism" and "Iban nationalism" in Malaysia is a testimony to this fact. It
is the former which has been articulated most forcefully, especially as Sabah was ruled by PBS,
a Kadazan-controlled party, for more than a decade. In order to "win" back Sabah, UMNO set
up its own branch and division there and allowed for the first time non-Muslim bumiputera to
become members, a kind of compromise on the principles of Malayness upon which UMNO has
based its existence for the last four decades. Even though UMNO finally got to rule Sabah
after the dramatic 1990 state elections, the "fire" of Kadazan nationalism seems to be still
burning. This was evidenced by the ability of PBS to win a large number of parliamentary
seats in Sabah in the 1995 elections.
Whichever faction within the Malay and/or bumiputera group is dominating the National
Front, one important fact remains critical, more so now then before, namely, the support of the
Chinese. Since the Chinese community are numerically not really a minority in a traditional
demographic sense, the importance and influence of the Chinese vision of nation must not be
ignored and underrated. Besides, the community has economic clout. Many of its economic
elites have successfully helped the rise of Malay corporate entrepreneurs and paved the way for
successful Malaysian and Chinese joint ventures in the People's Republic of China (PRC) ,
Taiwan and Hong Kong. A few have even been entrusted with managing important
government-funded private companies. Thousands of Chinese Malaysian private students have
successfully completed their tertiary education abroad and have come home to make critical
contributions to Malaysia's economic success. Therefore, the strength of the Chinese view and
voice in the long-run is not going to be diminished, but will rather be reinforced both politically
and economically, despite claims of contrary trends.
UMNO, for instance, is becoming more and more dependent on Chinese voters for political
support in provincial towns. It is not surprising that, with the emergence of PRC as a potential
economic giant in Asia in the next century, the bumiputera-dominated Malaysian government has
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become more willing to listen to Chinese demands. The recent "Islam and Confucianism"
dialogue organised by Malaysia's deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim is but one of the many
signs of the "softening" of attitude, if a rhetorical one, towards the Chinese community.
This in turn redefined the Chinese perception of UMNO, not only as a party for the Malays
but also as the "broker of wealth" in Malaysia [Shamsul 1996b]. For instance, Chinese
businessmen no longer consider it necessary to go through MCA or any other Chinese-dominated
party within the ruling National Front coalition to have access to the country's wealth. This,
in fact, led the MCA to change its party strategy in the early 1990s. dropping its economic role,
and now focusing on educational and cultural matters [Ling Leong Sik 1995]. Thus, although
UMNO exists as a party for the Malays. it is also the party that everyone who is interested in
the country's wealth wants to be associated with. However, this does not mean that issue of
"national identity" is a closed issue, it is still very much an open one as far as the Chinese
community is concerned, as MCA is still deeply interested in "cultural" matters.
"Fragmented Vision" or "Constructed Illusion": Identity Contestation
and the Making of Knowledge on Malaysia
The presence of the various nations-of-intent in Malaysia has had its impact on the construction
of social scientific knowledge about Malaysia; hence it must not be dismissed out of hand. This
is especially evident in the rise of the "new" middle class in Malaysia, whose involvement in the
process of "mental production" has become increasingly significant. That they have played the
role of "backroom boys" as well as the "main actors" in Malaysian politics and economy is
abundantly clear but rarely examined critically. In fact, foreign scholars and analysts have
been dragged, directly and indirectly. into this "ethnoscape" and nation-of-intent realm and
complicity hence the debate on national identity.
Like the political left in Malaysia. who find that the "ethnic question" is a thorny and
unresolvable issue [Ikmal Said 1992]. the so-called "radical scholars" Oocal and foreign) who
study Malaysia also have to confront the unresolvable nation-of-intent-related "ethnicity" issue.
As a consequence. it could be argued that social science knowledge about Malaysia has become
highly ethnicised, even among them. By this I mean that knowledge. irrespective of
philosophical and theoretical grounding, has been used directly or indirectly as an instrument to
advocate an ethnic cause or to launch purportedly "an objective. scientific critic" of an ethnic
group or to justify the interest of an ethnic or sub-ethnic group.13l It could also refer to
13) I wish to draw the readers' attention to a debate in Malaysian studies that went largely unnoticed.
Though it was supposedly to be on the theme "the construction of Malaysian identity" but it was
really on "Malay ethnicity." It was initiated by the article of Joel S. Kahn. an Australian-based
American academic, entitled. "Constructing Malaysian Ethnicity: A View from Australia." Ilmu
Masyarakat, 14. lan 1988-lune 1989, pp.6-8, to which lohan Saravanamuttu and Maznah Mohamad. both
from Universiti Sains Malaysia. Penang. responded and pointed out the problematic approach and
flawed argument presented by Kahn in their correspondence entitled "Deconstructing a Construction/
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knowledge that is structured according to a perceived ethnic division within which an academic
analysis is framed. such as within the various nations-of-intent. For instance, there have been
circumstances where Malaysianists, both local and foreign, have adopted a Marxist or Neo-
Marxist approach in their critique of the Malay-dominated Malaysian state while at the same
time using the occasion to advance an openly chauvinistic argument on the so-called "Malay
capital," "Malay" state, "Bumiputera state" and so on [see for example, Cham 1975; Hua Wu Yin
1983; Fatimah Halim 1990].
Academic writings on the NEP and its implementation, both in English and the Malay
language the collection of which is enormous, provide us with the best examples to date of how
knowledge on Malaysia has been ethnicised because the policy itself has been considered by
many as a controversial one. On the one hand, a number of non-bumiputera scholars opposed to
the NEP have been writing "scholarly" books and articles in international journals on the impact
of this discriminatory policy on lower-class Malaysian Chinese and how it has made a few
bumiputera extremely rich.14) On the other hand, a group of bumiputera scholars has defended
the NEP and published "academic" pieces which argue that without the NEP the condition of the
poor bumiputera would worsen and another racial riot occur as a consequence. They also ask,
"what's wrong with having more bumiputera millionaires?"
It is significant to note that, with the exception of Peter Searle's recent Ph. D. thesis
[1994], no detailed and systematic studies have been carried out to show the role of the
Malaysian Chinese in the commercial sector, or to what extent they have benefited from the
NEP.1S ) For non-bumiputera scholars to describe the benefits that Chinese have received from
the NEP would only weaken their "academic" argment about the highly discriminatory nature of
the policy. The "nationalist" bumiputera scholars seem to find it a waste of time to study
"'" on Malay Ethnicity from Australia: A View from Malaysia," /lmu Masyarakat, 15, July- Sept. 1989,
pp. 92-93. This perhaps demonstrates the point I raised above regarding "ethnicised knowledge."
Another recent article which has the same tone as that of Kahn's is by Yumin Lee [1995] commenting
on the relationship between planned change and the rise of bumiputeraism at the expense of non-
bumiputera. Her discussion inevitably was drawn to the formulation and the implementation of the
NEP. See also Healy's [1994] discussion on the gender aspect of "Malay ethnicity."
14) Perhaps it is more fashionable nowadays to talk about the rise of the new Malay corporate class and
UMNO's central role in it in terms of "rent-seeking" Domo 1995], instead of "corporate involvement of
political parties" [Gomez 1994], which is indeed a phenomenon that has accompanied the rise of the
bourgeosie class both in Europe and outside Europe, too. Of course, the specific forms it takes are
historically-determined. The historical and specific role of the Malaysian Chinese compradors as
collaborators of the new Malay corporate class seems to be conveniently neglected in the analyses of
the above-mentioned "rent-seeking" paradigm. This raises a pertinent "sociology of knowledge"
Question. Once, not so long ago, it was argued thai "ethnography is a fiction" because the author-
anthropologist selects what to include and exclude in his monograph, thus in the end presents a kind
of fictionalised narrative of a community that has been studied. Following that line of argument, and
knowing very well how statistics can be abused, could the so-called objective "economic analysis" be a
fiction too? I think it is more than possible.
15) Before Searle [1994], a number of scholars have made brief attempts to explore the gains and losses
that the Malaysian Chinese comprador class have experienced since the implementation of the NEP,
see, Lim Lin Lean [1978], Hara [1991], Heng Pek Koon [1992].
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ethnic groups other than the bumijrntera.
In this sense, writings on the NEP have inevitably shown symptoms of this tendency to
ethnicised knowledge. Most of the ethnicised writings are about bumiputera, their faults and
foibles. On the non-bumiputera, particularly on the Chinese, the writings tell us how they resist
bumijrntera dominance but not what some have gained in the NEP era. From a Western
viewpoint, this is an example of what may be called "academic dishonesty." In the Malaysian
context it could be seen as an "academic articulation," by Malaysianists (often under the label of
"critical analysis"), of the various ethnic groups' interests and nations-of-intent. The
implication of this "academic dishonesty" or "academic articulation" (depending from which
angle one chooses to see) has led to what could be called as the "internationalisation of
ethnicised knowledge" on Malaysia. It simply means that the "authority-defined knowledge"
offered by the so-called authority and experts on Malaysia in the international arena, often
couched in "critical analysis" fashion, is shaped and informed by the domestic ethnicised
knowledge context in Malaysia. 16 )
In other words. it is not uncommon in Malaysian social science discourse that even the best
of the academic contributions written in the best Western academic tradition with the best of
intentions function as an outlet for the discontented Malaysians they describe, most likely a
particular ethnic group. This is an unfortunate situation but a reality that many Malaysian
social scientists, of all ethnic backgrounds, and foreign scholars specialising on Malaysia, do not
dare to admit. Inevitably, since many of these scholars have become "backroom boys" to the
various communal organisations and ethnic-based political parties, this ethnicised knowledge
would further contribute towards the perpetuation of ethnic division in Malaysia.
However, despite the ethnicised tone of these contributions, it is healthy sign for
contemporary Malaysian society that brave Malaysian scholars, of all theoretical pursuasions
and ethnic origins, are able to air their anti-"bumiputera establishment" views. For this reason
alone the ethnicised contributions were interesting reading. Ironically, this has been the force
which has created such a vibrant social scientific discourse amongst Malaysianists, local and
16) Some conspiratorial theorists amongst the Malaysianists have even suggested that the internationalisa-
tion of ethnicised knowledge on Malaysia have led to the a particular form of so-called discursive dis-
course (critical. anti-government, anti-Malay hegemony. ethnicised) being privileged and those who
subscribes to it have an easier access to international publications because the anonymous referees
and those sitting on the editorial advisory boards are in favour of that particular form of discursive
discourse. This group of Malaysianists even harbour the suspicion that the scholars of the so-called
"discursive discourse school" of having hidden political agenda. For that matter, no scholar can
realistically be a-political. I believe this is an unfounded suspicion based on a cynical (perhaps
chauvinistic) viewpoint. However. my personal experience in Australia. the USA. Japan and Europe
tells me that I have often been invited to international seminars and conferences not only because of
my research on a topic the sponsors are interested in but also because. as put to me by a famous
anthropologist from University of Chicago a decade ago. I am the "rare breed of Malays who can
criticise the Malays openly." The statement tells less about myself but more about that particular
scholar's lack of knowledge regarding the history of the Malays. particularly its intelligentsia. and
Malay literary works often rich in articulating "self-doubt" and "self-criticism." see the contribution of
Henk Meier in this volume.
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foreign, thus far. There are, of course, other power dimensions besides electoral power in
contemporary Malaysia. A more balanced focus containing discussion of the attributes of
powerful non-bumiputera and how the alliance of the elites across ethnic boundaries shapes
Malaysian contemporary culture and politics would have mitigated, for example, the ethnicised
flavour of much writing on Malaysian politics and culture [Shamsul 1996a]. There have been
serious attempts to redress this problem by a number of Malaysianists, however, a recent
debate regarding Melayu Baru, or the New Malay, within the bumiputera community, shows that
it is still informed by UMNO's nation-of-intent [Rustam A. Sani 1993]. The on-going debate on
"national culture" [Aziz Deraman 1975; Kua Kia Soong 1985] is also highly ethnicised and
framed within the various nations-of-intent discussed above.
The "hidden agenda" behind the ethnicised social scientific knowledge about Malaysia has
rarely been discussed for the simple reason that most of the scholars involved are themselves
trapped in the complex web of this rather unfortunate analytical complicity, in fact abyss, from
which they found it impossible to get out of. I7 ) If observed carefully, one could easily detect
for instance the often repeated statement or argument that the NEP, as a policy, is highly
discriminatory and against the principles of meritocracy. Some even went as far as to argue
that the whole Malay special privilege, perceived as the social root of the NEP, is an "imperial
myth" [Kahn 1995: 55-57]. On the other hand, the supporters of the NEP would argue that the
policy is an instrument to create some form of social justice in a culturally diversified and
economically unequal society characterised by a distinct pattern of ethnic identification to
specific economic activities.
In short, what could be surmised from all this is that there is a clear dissatisfaction, on
both sides of the fence, over the NEP and its implementation, each articulated in idioms related
to a vague concept of social justice, perhaps one which belongs to the "traditional liberal
approach" that claims that unity in cultural diversity could be achieved when individuals and
groups have freedom of speech and expression, and social inequality should be resolved through
meritocracy. Others offer arguments previously advanced by the so-called "communitarian
approach" in which it is argued that there cannot be one general concept of the common good
and of social justice across all societies and cultures. A number of those who have advanced
their arguments along this line ended up in an exercise of cultural relativism claiming the
uniqueness of Malaysia as a society, and "its way" of dealing with problems of diversity and
difference.
17) In footnote 13, I offered an example to demonstrate an aspect of the ethnicised knowledge within
Malaysian social studies. It is interesting to note that Joel Kahn [1988/89] did not respond to
Saravanamuttu and Maznah Mohamed's [1990] critique. In fact, he continued to repeat and expand
the very same problematic points and flawed arguments found in that article in a number of other
articles subsequently published as book chapters or journal articles [see Kahn 1992; 1994; 1995;
1996a; 1996b]. This was made obvious by the fact that in nearly all of these articles he used a
particular example which consist a rather elementary translation error that was repeated, namely, the
title of a Malay novel by Shahnon Ahmad which should be Kemelut (Crisis) not Kemulut (lit. putting
something to one's mouth).
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To my mind, the issue of "social justice,,,18) raised in various forms and manners, is the
most critical but yet-to-be seriously explored aspect in the debate regarding NEP and also on
the issue of national identity in Malaysia hence the question why should one community be more
privileged than the other and the like. However, the hidden "social justice" debate has often
been framed within the problematic "majority-minority contestation," namely, "Malay majority
versus non-Malay minority," because the perceived "majority-minority" dichotomy is purely
based on numerical and demographic factor. When applied to the Malaysian case and we use
the Singapore situation as a backdrop, in which the Chinese population is the overwhelming
majority with the Indians and Malays as distinct minority groups, the often-claimed minority
position of the Chinese in Malaysia looks not only highly contrived but an analytical illusion.
Sinologists such as Mary Somers Heidhues (see, her book, Southeast Asia Chinese Minorities
[1974J) had advanced an historical analysis on the Chinese in Malaysia in this problematic
majority-minority thesis. As I have argued elsewhere in this essay. the use of such a
dichotomy does not help us instead put us deeper into the ethnicization of knowledge exercise,
even if it is informed by some vague notion of "social justice."
Conclusion
The Malaysian experience is offered here as an empirical example of how the debate on
identities has not only been influenced by contexts and circumstances, historical and
contemporary, in a particular society but it also has an influential role in the formation of social
scientific knowledge about the society. It also shows that the debate is informed by at least
two major perspectives, namely, the authority-defined and the everyday-defined, each with its
own internal divisions. In this essay I have presented two examples from the authority-defined
context. first, in the Malay/bumiputera elite context and. second, involving the academic
Malaysianists. The social dynamics engendered within these two situations are, of course,
constantly being influenced by a wider societal constituency and concern, which in turn sustain
the debate on the issue of "national identity" thus keeping it open for public participation
despite the attempt by the dominant power structure to mute it.
In the Malaysian case, although the ruling elite has defined that the real challenge for
Malaysians is to create a united Malaysian nation, or Bangsa Malaysia, the general populace
however seems to argue that the challenge is really to seek a middle ground or a compromise
between an authority-defined nation, framed within the context of bumiputera dominance (as
articulated by a particular group within the bumiputera, namely, UMNO), and the everyday
ideas about nations-of-intent and national identity propagated by both the various bumiputera
and non-bumiputera group. Some of the latter have their social roots deep in the past and
18) See John Rawls. A Theory of Justice [1972]. A brilliant application of Rawls' theses on multicultural
Australia has been done by Dr. Andrew Theophanous. See, his books, Understanding Social Justice:
An Australian Perspective [1994] and Understanding Multiculturalism and Australian Identity [1995].
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others in the recent post-colonial circumstances.
The intervention by the social scientists, local and foreign, in the form of perpetuating
ethnicised social scientific knowledge framed in the nation-of-intent perspective, does not help
this attempt to find a middle ground. The fact remains that irrespective of ethnic groups. what
is being proposed and actively promoted has been a variety of nations-of-intent that could form
Malaysia's future "nationalist ideology" hence "national identity."
I would therefore suggest that perhaps the concept of nation-of-intent is analytically useful
to understand the contradictions within the general discourse on "nationalism," "nationalist
ideology," "national identity," and "nationhood" in the societies of emerging industrial economies
such as in the East Asian region, for example, in Malaysia. It may also assist us to understand
that particular discourse in a more positive light, separating analytically the authority-defined
nation-of-intent (often imbued with assimilationist tendencies) from the everyday-defined forms
(often adopting a more accommodative position) of the people at large, and how these two sets
of nations-of-intent are articulated interests and how the state and people come to terms with
that of the other.
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